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TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A DEFENSE:
ELIMINATING THE EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY-HARASSER
DEFENSE
Shylah Miles
Abstract. Sexual harassment is a prevalent problem in the American workplace that
accounts for nearly sixty-four percent of all gender discrimination claims under Title VII. The
equal-opportunity-harasser defense allows harassers who target both males and females to
escape liability. Courts have allowed the defense because they have interpreted the "because
of sex" element of a sexual harassment claim to require disparate treatment or a showing that
the plaintiffs would not have been harassed if they were members of the opposite sex. An
equal-opportunity harasser harasses both sexes and, therefore, plaintiffs cannot prove
disparate treatment. This Comment argues that the disparate-treatment requirement does not
fit the sexual harassment model because it is a class-based analysis and sexual harassment is
an individual-based discrimination. By limiting analysis of equal-opportunity-harasser claims
to disparate treatment, courts allow sexual inequality in the workplace to continue,
undermining the purpose behind sexual harassment laws. To rectify this situation, the courts
should adopt an individual analysis of the "because of sex" element, which a recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision allows. Adoption of an individual analysis will follow current trends
in federal and Washington state courts to limit applicability of the defense and will enable
courts to deny the equal-opportunity-harasser defense.
"We must be aware that whatever rules we develop will require
constant reexamination, modification, and fine-tuning. The sexual,
gender, and preference revolutions are not over. Society is in a
constant state of evolution. "'
Steven and Karen worked in the maintenance department at the
Indiana Department of Transportation.2 Their male supervisor, Gale,
aimed his sexually charged actions and explicit language toward both
Steven and Karen on separate occasions.3 Specifically, Gale touched
Karen's body, stood too close to her, asked her to sleep with him, and
made sexist comments.4 Gale also sexually propositioned Steven while
1. Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, Foreivord to BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, at xix (1992).
2. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2000). The descriptions in the text are the
actual facts of Holman. That court decided that the equal-opportunity-harasser defense protected the
employer from liability in a sexual harassment claim. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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grabbing his head.5 Disturbed by their supervisor's conduct, both sought
legal relief through a sexual harassment claim against their employer.6
After litigation, the two victims learned that Title VII harassment law
offered them no protection from this harasser.7 Even though the law
protects employees against same-sex and opposite-sex sexual harass-
ment,8 federal courts have held that the harassment they were exposed to
was not of either of these types.9 Instead, they were being harassed by an
equal-opportunity harasser,' 0 whose status protects the employer from
liability." Courts reason that when a supervisor harasses both a man and
a woman, there is no disparate treatment and therefore plaintiffs cannot
satisfy the element of a sexual harassment claim that requires proof that
the harassment was "because of sex."' 2 This legal gap in the protection of
victims against sexual harassment exists in Washington law as well as in
most federal circuits. 1
3
As new fact scenarios develop in sexual harassment law, law aimed to
protect victims from sexual harassment must evolve in order to continue
to protect all individuals from sexual harassment in the workplace. This
Comment advocates that courts dismantle the equal-opportunity-harasser
defense " by adopting an individual analysis of the "because of sex"
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 403.
8. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 82 (1998).
9. Infra note 94.
10. This Comment applies equally to both the bisexual and equal-opportunity-harasser defenses.
Bisexual harassment occurs when a supervisor extorts or attempts to extort sexual favors or tolerance
of sexual harassment from a male and a female employee in exchange for a job, a job benefit, or
protection from adverse employment actions. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Another form of bisexual harassment occurs where the harasser is bisexual but does not
harass members of both sexes. See Rycek v. Guest Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 761 n.6 (D.D.C.
1995). Where a supervisor creates a work environment that unreasonably interferes with a male and
a female's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment for
employees of both sexes, the supervisor is referred to as an equal-opportunity harasser. See
Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-37 (D. Wyo. 1993). An equal-
opportunity harasser might not actually be bisexual. See id.
11. Holman, 211 F.3d at 403.
12. Id.
13. Herried v. Pierce County Pub. Transp. Benefit Auth. Corp., 90 Wash. App. 468,473,957 P.2d
767, 770 (1998); Payne v. Children's Home Soc'y, Inc., 77 Wash. App. 507, 509, 892 P.2d 1102,
1104 (1995); see infra note 94 and accompanying text.
14. Although this Comment refers to evidence of harassment of both sexes as the equal-
opportunity-harasser defense, it is not an affirmative defense. Rather, it is an evidentiary showing
that prohibits satisfaction of the "because of sex" element of a sexual harassment claim. Reference to
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element and by disregarding the harasser's treatment of others. Part I
discusses sexual harassment, the incidence of claims, and the effects of
sexual harassment in the workplace. Part II explains the status of sexual
harassment law generally in the federal courts and in Washington. Part
Ill examines how federal and Washington courts use the equal-
opportunity-harasser defense. Finally, Part IV argues that evidence of
disparate treatment should be replaced by an individual analysis of the
"because of sex" element so that the defense may be denied.
I. THE PROBLEMS AND PERVASIVENESS OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
Sexual harassment is a pervasive problem that erects and maintains
barriers to sexual equality in the workplace. Sexual harassment occurs
when "submission to... [unwelcome sexual] conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment."' 5 In 1999, sexual harassment claims accounted for 64% of
all gender discrimination claims under Title VII and the proportion filed
by male employees increased from 9% in 1992 to 12% in 1997_1999.16
Approximately 50% to 85% of American females will experience some
form of sexual harassment during their academic or working lives. 7
Sexual harassment hinders equality of the sexes because it supports a
sexual hierarchy, punishing those who do not conform to sexual
stereotypes.'8 A harasser may view individuals as stereotypically male or
female.' 9 Where individuals do not conform to the harasser's precon-
ceptions, the harasser singles out the victim based on the victim's
the defense in this Comment will represent an evidentiary showing by which a defendant overcomes
a plaintiff's inference of discrimination based on sex.
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(l) (2000).
16. EEOC, Enforcement Statistics, at http'.//www.eeoc.gov/statsl (last visited Jan. 24, 2001).
There are no comprehensive statistics for the total number of all workplace harassment complaints,
formal and informal, because there is no central repository for the reporting of complaints that are
resolved before going to the agency or judicial stage. Id.
17. The Diversity Training Group, Sexual Harassment Facts, at http'//www.diversitydtg.com/
articles/shfacts.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2001).
18. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS 14, 233 (1988).
19. See Sandra Levitsky, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual Defense" Loophole in Title VII
Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1013, 1030-31 (1996) (describing theorists' belief that
sexual harassment occurs in part through "gender differentiation" and creation of "mutually
exclusive gender scripts for males and females").
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divergence from scripted gender norms.2" The harasser's "sexual mis-
conduct" may serve to block professional advancement for men and
women because such misconduct may interfere with the individual's
work performance, may create a hostile work environment, and can be
directly linked to denial of job benefits.2' Sexual harassment qualifies as
sex discrimination because individuals are treated differently because of
their sex.2 Both Washington and federal courts have sought to prohibit
sexual harassment so that these barriers to sexual equality can be
eradicated.23
One recent development in sexual harassment law is the emergence of
equal-opportunity harassers. An equal-opportunity harasser harasses both
men and women.24 Under the traditional analysis of the "because of sex"
element of a sexual harassment claim, 25 plaintiffs must show that if they
were of the opposite sex, they would not have been harassed.26 Con-
sequently, when the perpetrator harasses both men and women, this
element is impossible to satisfy, leaving plaintiffs without protection
under sexual harassment law. 27 Accordingly, the status of an equal-
opportunity harasser has become a defense to liability. 28 Courts have
been frustrated by this problem as they try to allow claims against equal-
opportunity harassers yet still comply with the disparate-treatment
requirement.
II. FEDERAL AND WASHINGTON STATE LAW REGARDING
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Federal and Washington laws prohibit sexual harassment in the
workplace. In so doing, both systems have identified the elements of a
20. See E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the
"Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 72 n.79 (1997)
(explaining criticisms of Spitko's article by Catherine A. MacKinnon, professor of law at University
of Michigan).
21. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
22. See Deb Lussier, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. and the Future of Title VII
Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence, 39 B.C. L. REV. 937, 944-45 (1998).
23. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67; see Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 401, 405,
693 P.2d 708, 711 (1985).
24. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-37 (D. Wyo. 1993).
25. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
26. Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 406, 693 P.2d at 712.
27. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000).
28. Id.
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sexual harassment claim and the evidence to satisfy them in like fashion.
The only substantial difference is that, by statute, Washington explicitly
states that courts are to construe the sexual harassment statute liberally in
order to fulfill its purpose, while federal law does not.
A. Federal Law Against Sexual Harassment
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act29 prohibits sex discrimination,
which courts have interpreted to include sexual harassment. By making
sexual harassment actionable as sex discrimination, courts have required
that sexual harassment claims satisfy the elements of a sex discrimination
claim.3" Most important to the analysis of the equal-opportunity harasser
defense is the "because of sex" element. Although courts routinely
require evidence of disparate treatment to satisfy the "because of sex"
element, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision has provided plaintiffs
with more flexibility in meeting this element.
1. Title VII Has Been Interpreted To Prohibit Sexual Harassment
In 1964, Congress declared that sex discrimination in employment
was prohibited, but it failed either to define "sex!' or list included
offenses. Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress made it
unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."'3 The prohibition against discrimination based on sex
was a last-minute amendment in the House of Representatives in an
effort to rouse opposition to the bill.32 Despite this effort, the bill passed
as amended, with little debate on the substantive merits of prohibiting
sex discrimination in the workplace.33 The Senate held no debate on the
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
30. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Title VII prohibits discrimination based on group identity. See
Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. LJ. 1129, 1138 (1999).
32. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
33. Id.
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issue, either.34 The lack of debate left very little legislative history to
guide courts in interpreting what Congress intended sex discrimination to
include.
Although the language of Title VII failed to specifically address
sexual harassment, case law has established that Title VII proscribes
such conduct. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,36 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that sexual harassment violates Title VII.37 The Court rea-
soned that when a supervisor harasses an employee because of the
employee's sex, that supervisor discriminates on the basis of sex, and
this discrimination is "every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality."'3
Following the Meritor decision, federal courts have interpreted the
term "sex" to refer to gender39 and have recognized two different forms
of sexual harassment: hostile work environment40 and quid pro quo.4
Hostile work environment harassment occurs when offensive and un-
welcome conduct is sufficiently severe to create an abusive or hostile
work environment.4" Quid pro quo harassment is the extortion or at-
tempted extortion of sexual favors in exchange for a job, a job benefit, or
protection from adverse employment actions.43
To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual
harassment, the plaintiff must establish five elements. Federal courts
require the plaintiff to prove that: (1) the employee is a member of a
34. Kristi J. Johnson, Comment, Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corporation: What Does it Mean to
Be Harassed "Because of' Your Sex?: Sexual Stereotyping and the "Bisexual" Harasser Revisited,
79 IOWA L. REv. 731, 736 (1994).
35. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). However, legislative history reflects
congressional intent to equalize women's economic position with men. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong. 2 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2140-41.
36. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
37. Id. at 73.
38. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982)); see Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983).
39. DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1986); Ulane v. E.
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,
329 (9th Cir. 1979). It thus follows that sex refers to male or female and not sexual preference.
40. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991).
41. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11 th Cir. 1982). This Comment is
concerned with both types of sexual harassment because a bisexual harasser exists in both quid pro
quo and hostile work environment contexts.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3) (2000).
43. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
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protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon sex; (4) the harassment
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment and was
sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
employment and create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment; 4 and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.4"
With some variation, federal courts widely follow this formulation of the
hostile work environment harassment case.46
The elements of quid pro quo harassment are nearly identical to
hostile work environment harassment. Instead of a "severe and
pervasive" element, quid pro quo has an element that requires receipt of
an employment benefit or protection from a job detriment in exchange
for the harassment by the supervisor.47 Both types of claims require that
harassment be "because of sex."
2. The "Because of Sex" Element
a. How the "Because of Sex" Element Is Traditionally Satisfied
Courts traditionally require plaintiffs to prove the "because of sex"
element with evidence of disparate treatment.4' Thus, plaintiffs must
show that they would not have been harassed if the plaintiff had been of
the opposite sex.49 The disparate treatment need not be sexual in nature to
constitute sexual harassment," but the harassment must be motivated by
a gender-based animus."' Conversely, the "because of sex" element is not
automatically fulfilled just because the harasser's words have "sexual
content or connotations."" Courts may have created this limitation
44. This is referred to as the "severe and pervasive" element. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 63-73 (1986). This element ensures that the actions by the alleged harasser substantially
affected the conditions of employment and that the actions were not ordinary socializing. Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
45. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-73; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11.
46. BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT' IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
132 (1992).
47. Henson, 682 F.2d at 909-10.
48. Id. at 904.
49. Id.
50. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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because sexually explicit conduct does not necessarily intimate a
motivation to harass because of sex and, instead, could be linked to
general dislike for the individual or juvenile provocation. 3 Therefore,
courts allow room to reject a sexual harassment claim where harassment
is motivated by these types of considerations. 4
b. Why Courts Use Disparate Treatment To Satisfy the "Because of
Sex" Element
Courts have traditionally used disparate treatment, a class-based
analysis, to satisfy the "because of sex" element instead of an individual-
based analysis. Class-based discrimination occurs when a perpetrator
chooses a victim based on his or her membership in a targeted class.55
For example, a class-based discriminator can be presumed to discrim-
inate against all members of a class (e.g., females). 56 In contrast,
individual discrimination occurs when a perpetrator selects a victim
based on factors in addition to membership in a targeted class.57 An
individual discriminator may not discriminate against an entire targeted
class and instead may choose only one individual based on both the
victim's membership in that class and individual factors such as
personality and physical characteristics. 8
When the U.S. Supreme Court expanded Title VII to include sexual
harassment, it borrowed the elements from traditional sex discrimination
claims and thereby established a class-based analysis of sexual
harassment.5 9 Traditional sex discrimination occurs when a person is
treated differently than other similarly situated individuals solely because
of his or her sex. 60 This is a class-based discrimination because a
53. See Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc., 729 N.E.2d 726, 735 (Ohio 2000); Doe v.
Wash. Dep't of Transp., 85 Wash. App. 143, 149-50, 931 P.2d 196,200 (1997).
54. See Doe, 85 Wash. App. at 149-50, 931 P.2d at 200.
55. Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 333,352 (1990).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Steven S. Locke, The Equal-Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing Sexual
Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383, 393 (1996) (suggesting that
sexual harassment should not be included under sex discrimination because sexual harasser
demonstrates preference for victim).
60. Butler v. N.Y. State Dep't of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 746 (2d Cir. 2000). Sex discrimination is a
broader cause of action than sexual harassment because any treatment of the victim because of the
Vol. 76:603, 2001
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perpetrator will generally select victims based solely on their sex and can
be assumed to discriminate against all members of the victims' sex. 6,
With this in mind, courts fashioned a class-based analysis of the
"because of sex" element, which required evidence of disparate treatment
of the sexes.62 Disparate treatment requires plaintiffs to prove that, but
for their sex, they would not have been discriminated against. 3 When
courts crafted elements of a sexual harassment claim, they read this
element into the text of Title VII, which bans discrimination "because of
sex."' Until confronted with a same-sex harassment scenario, courts
relied solely on evidence of the class-based disparate-treatment
requirement to satisfy the "because of sex" element.
C. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: The U.S. Supreme
Court Presents Alternatives for Satisfying the "Because of Sex"
Element
The U.S. Supreme Court modified evidentiary options for satisfying
the "because of sex" element when it was confronted with a fact scenario
that could not fit in the traditional class-based discrimination analysis. In
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,65 the Court was faced with
a same-sex harassment action.66 The plaintiff worked in an all-male
environment, which made disparate treatment impossible to show.67 The
plaintiff charged that his two supervisors had "assaulted him in a sexual
manner" and threatened to rape him.68 In determining that same-sex
harassment was actionable under Title VII, the Court identified three
types of evidence that might satisfy the "because of sex" element: (1)
comparative evidence, (2) gender-specific conduct or actions, or (3)
explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity.
69
victim's sex is prohibited under sex discrimination. Sexual harassment, which is included under sex
discrimination, is narrower because a cause of action exists only where a person is being harassed
because of his or her sex.
61. Locke, supra note 59, at 393-95; Paul, supra note 55, at 352.
62- Locke, supra note 59, at 393-95; Paul, supra note 55, at 352.
63. Locke, supra note 59, at 393-95.
64. Id. at 393.
65. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
66. Id. at 76.
67. Id. at 77.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 79-81.
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Prior to Oncale, plaintiffs could only satisfy this element through
proof of disparate treatment.7" Oncale now provides plaintiffs with three
evidentiary routes in which a fact-finder may draw reasonable inferences
that the harassment was because of the plaintiff's sex.7 Commentators
have recognized that Oncale allows greater flexibility in establishing
sexual harassment claims.72
B. Washington State Law Against Sexual Harassment
The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) 3 is similar to
Title VII. Accordingly, Washington courts follow the reasoning of the
federal courts when addressing sexual harassment claims. This reasoning
includes requiring evidence of disparate treatment to satisfy the "because
of sex" element.
In 1949, Washington State enacted the WLAD,74 which recognized as
a civil right "the opportunity to obtain employment without dis-
crimination because of race, creed, color or national origin."75 The
WLAD made it an unfair labor practice for employers to "discriminate
against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of
employment because of such person's race, creed, color or national
origin. 7 6 In 1971, the Legislature expanded the WLAD to protect all
inhabitants of the state from sex discrimination and to eliminate and
prevent such discrimination in employment.77
Washington courts have found that sexual harassment in the
workplace violates the WLAD. 78 Because the WLAD is similar in
purpose and subject matter to Title VII discrimination claims,
70. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982).
71. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-8 1.
72. BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
52 (Supp. 1999); Mary Coombs, Title VII & Homosexual Harassment Afler Oncale: Was it a
Victory?, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 113, 129-30 (1999); Lussier, supra note 22, at 957-58.
73. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.60 (2000).
74. Ch. 183, 1949 Wash. Laws 506 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.010-
.401 (2000)).
75. Ch. 183, § 2, 1949 Wash. Laws at 506.
76. Id. § 7(1)(c), 1949 Wash. Laws at 512 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010).
77. Ch. 81, § 3, 1971 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 549, 551 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.60.180).
78. See DeWater v. Wash., 130 Wash. 2d 128, 134, 921 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996); Glasgow v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 401,404, 693 P.2d 708, 711 (1985); Payne v. Children's Home
Soc'y of Wash., Inc., 77 Wash. App. 507, 511,892 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1995).
Vol. 76:603, 2001
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Washington courts view cases interpreting the federal law as persuasive
when construing the Washington statute.79 Like the federal courts, Wash-
ington courts divide sexual harassment into hostile work environ-ment
sexual harassment ° and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims."' The
elements of a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual
harassmente 2 are substantially similar to the elements under federal law.83
Following the path of the federal courts, Washington courts adopted
the traditional "but for sex" analysis from the sex discrimination model
without regard to the individualized nature of sexual harassment claims.
As a result, Washington adopted a class-based analysis for individual-
based conduct.84 Accordingly, under Washington law a plaintiff must
show that he or she would not have been harassed had he or she been of
the opposite sex.85
The WLAD does differ in one significant aspect from Title VII in that
the WLAD requires that the statute be given liberal construction in order
to accomplish its purpose. 6 Washington courts have acknowledged this
mandate. In Payne v. Children's Home Society of Washington, Inc.,8 7 the
court of appeals decided that conduct that was not sexual could still
support a sexual harassment claim.8 8 Although the WLAD did not ad-
dress this issue, the court reasoned that such conduct would still produce
barriers to sexual equality in the workplace.8 9 Therefore, although federal
79. Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 376, 610 P.2d 857, 861 (1980); Payne, 77 Wash.
App. at 512, 892 P.2d at 1105;.
80. Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 406-07,693 P.2d at 711-12.
81. DeWater, 130 Wash. 2d at 134, 921 P.2d at 1062. Quid pro quo harassment is established in
the same manner as is the federal claim. Schonauer v. DCR Entm't, Inc., 79 Wash. App. 808, 823,
905 P.2d 392,401 (1995).
82. Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
83. The federal prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment claim contains
one element, which Washington State's provision does not have, that the plaintiff be a member of a
protected class. Washington courts have acknowledged this requirement but have not formally
included it within the enumerated provisions because the requirement is automatically met by the
employee being a man or a woman. Schonauer, 79 Wash. App. at 821 n.21, 905 P.2d at 399 n.21.
84. Locke, supra note 59, at 393; Paul, supra note 55, at 352.
85. Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 406, 693 P.2d at 712. Conduct does not have to be sexual in nature
in order to constitute a claim of sexual harassment. Payne v. Children's Home Soc'y of Wash., Inc.,
77 Wash. App. 507,510-12,892 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1995).
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.020 (2000); Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 404,693 P.2d at 711.
87. 77 Wash. App. 507, 892 P.2d 1102 (1995).
88. Id. at 510-12, 892 P.2d at 1104.
89. Id. at 510-11, 892 P.2d at 1104.
Washington Law Review
and Washington laws prohibit sexual harassment similarly, Washington
has the added requirement that courts construe the sexual harassment
statute liberally.
III. FEDERAL AND WASHINGTON STATE LAW REGARDING
THE EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY-HARASSER DEFENSE
Employers facing sexual harassment claims have sometimes asserted
that the harasser's conduct was not sexual harassment because the
employee harassed both men and women alike. The equal-opportunity-
harasser defense9" defeats plaintiffs' ability to satisfy the "because of
sex" element.9' Plaintiffs normally satisfy this element by showing that
they were singled out for adverse treatment based on the plaintiff's sex.92
Where men and women are being harassed alike, the plaintiff cannot
offer evidence of disparate treatment and therefore cannot prove dis-
crimination because of sex.93
Many Washington and federal courts, when faced with this new
dilemma, have been forced to accept the equal-opportunity-harasser
defense in practice because of the disparate-treatment requirement. Some
federal courts and the Washington Court of Appeals have managed to
avoid the defense and still find disparate treatment by analyzing the
degree of severity of the harassment. Other federal courts have rejected
the defense outright by replacing disparate treatment with an individual
analysis of the "because of sex" element.
A. Framework of Courts'Acceptance of the Equal-Opportunity-
Harasser Defense
Washington courts and at least six federal circuits have accepted in
principle the equal-opportunity-harasser defense.94 These courts reason
90. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-38 (D. Wyo. 1993).
91. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000).
92. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 903 (11 th Cir. 1982).
93. Holman, 211 F.3d at 403.
94. Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 319 (2d Cir. 1999); Scusa v. Nestle
U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 1999); Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011
(7th Cir. 1999); Butler v. Yslete Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 270 (5th Cir. 1998); Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,620 (6th Cir. 1986); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (1 1th Cir.); Payne v.
Children's Home Soc'y of Wash., Inc., 77 Wash. App. 507, 515, 892 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1995).
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that men and women exposed to the same offensive working
environment suffer no discrimination based on sex.95 Nondiscriminatory
harassment occurs when a supervisor directs abusive language, crude
gestures, or sexual demands on an equal-opportunity basis.96 Plaintiffs
cannot satisfy the "because of sex" element because these courts require
a showing of disparate treatment.97
One of the first federal cases to foresee the possibility of an equal-
opportunity harasser and the problems it would create under a disparate-
treatment analysis was Barnes v. Costle.98 In that case, the court noted in
dictum that demanding sexual favors from both men and women would
not constitute sexual harassment because the conduct was not dis-
criminatory on the basis of sex.9 9 Following Barnes, the Eleventh Circuit
in Henson v. City of Dundee.. also indicated that sexual overtures
directed toward both sexes or conduct that equally offended both sexes
would not be actionable under Title VII."' Both courts suggested that if
both sexes are being treated equally, disparate treatment would be
impossible to prove and plaintiffs would thus be unable to satisfy the
"because of sex" element. 102
The possibility of an equal-opportunity harasser became reality in
Holman v. Indiana, 3 where the Seventh Circuit was confronted with
such a case and refused to accept the sexual harassment claim."t° The
court reasoned that inappropriate conduct directed toward both sexes
falls outside Title VII's ambit and does not satisfy the "because of sex"
requirement because no disparate treatment occurs. 5 The court rejected
a reading of Oncale that allowed for other evidence besides disparate
treatment. 6 In addition, the court warned, if plaintiffs were not required
to show disparate treatment between the sexes, Title VII would become a
95. See supra note 94.
96. Holman, 211 F.3d at 403.
97. Id.
98. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
99. Id. at 990 n.55.
100. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
101. Id. at 903.
102. Id.
103. 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
104. Id. at 403-05.
105. Id.
106. Id.
Washington Law Review
"code of workplace civility," which the U.S. Supreme Court in Oncale
stated it did not want to happen.10 7
The Holman court rejected the argument that allowing such a defense
will encourage harassment of both sexes in an effort to insulate harassers
and employers from liability.'0 8 The court found it difficult to imagine
that harassers would understand the intricacies of sexual harassment
law.'0 9 Further, the court reasoned that employers would not manufacture
the defense because employers would be creating new claims of sexual
harassment and thus exposing themselves to additional liability." 0
When Washington faced an equal-opportunity-harasser scenario, the
court of appeals in Herried v. Pierce County Public Transportation
Benefit Authority Corp."' denied a claim for sexual harassment based on
a facial analysis of the "because of sex" element."' Herried alleged that a
co-worker created a hostile work environment by bumping Herried with
his body and refusing to make room in a hallway for Herried to pass,
forcing Herried to press against lockers in order to get by. "' These
incidents were compounded by the co-worker's threatening manner and
other conflicts between the co-worker and Herried. 14 The employer ar-
gued that the co-worker was hostile and intimidating to other employees
as well, both male and female. "' After the court found that the per-
petrator harassed members of both sexes, the court ended its
examination." 6 Based on this facial analysis, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence of harassment because
of her sex because the alleged harasser had harassed both sexes. 7
Without evidence of disparate treatment, Herried failed to satisfy the
"because of sex" element of her sexual harassment claim.18
107. Id. at 404 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 90 Wash. App. 468, 957 P.2d 767 (1998).
112. Id. at 473, 957 P.2d at 770. This was not the only reason for denial of the claim. The claim
was also denied because the defendant had taken sufficient corrective action after being notified of
the harassment. Id. at 473-75, 957 P.2d at 770-71.
113. Id. at 470-72, 957 P.2d at 768-69.
114. Id. at 470-473, 957 P.2d at 768-70.
115. Id. at 473, 957 P.2d at 770.
116. Id. at 473-74, 957 P.2d at 770.
117. Id. at 474, 957 P.2d at 770.
118. Id.
Vol. 76:603, 2001
The Equal-Opportunity-Harasser Defense
B. Avoiding the Equal-Opportunity-Harasser Defense Without
Rejecting It Outright
Some courts have sought to allow claims against equal-opportunity
harassers while still satisfying the disparate-treatment requirement. These
courts require trial courts to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the
"because of sex" element by focusing on the differences in the severity
of harassment. In an Eighth Circuit case, Kopp v. Samaritan Health
System,"1 9 the plaintiff presented evidence that her supervisor verbally
assaulted approximately ten female employees. 2 ' In response, the em-
ployer presented evidence that the supervisor had also verbally assaulted
four men and argued that the supervisor assaulted everyone and did not
discriminate against women.12' The court found that although the su-
pervisor directed harsh language toward both sexes, the supervisor's
language toward women was of a more serious nature, occurred more
often, and was sometimes accompanied by physical contact.'2 By con-
cluding that the supervisor treated women more harshly than men, the
court reasoned that a fact-finder could conclude that the defendant's
treatment of women was worse than his treatment of men and hence
there was disparate treatment of the sexes.2
A Washington court was also able to allow a claim against an equal-
opportunity harasser while still meeting the disparate-treatment
requirement of the "because of sex" element by conducting an in-depth
analysis of the facts. In Kahn v. Salerno,24 the defendant argued that he
did not single the plaintiff out because of her sex because he had
harassed other employees, both males and females. 12 Reversing a sum-
mary judgment, the court of appeals ordered the trial court to determine
whether the defendant's harassing conduct was more abusive toward
women than men, and to inquire whether the severity of the impact
resulted in disparate treatment. 26 By requiring the trial courts to analyze
closely the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations rather
119. 13 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1993).
120. Id. at 269.
121. See id. at 268-69.
122. Id. at 269.
123. Id. at 269-70.
124. 90 Wash. App. 110, 951 P.2d 321 (1998).
125. Id. at 123, 951 P.2d at 328.
126. Id. at 124,951 P.2d at 329.
Washington Law Review
than ending the inquiry on the facial determination that both a male and a
female were harassed, the court opened the door to rejecting the equal-
opportunity-harasser defense outright.
C. Courts that Reject the Equal-Opportunity-Harasser Defense
The Ninth Circuit and a district court in the Tenth Circuit have
rejected the defense. In Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.,'27 the Ninth
Circuit stated in dicta that evidence of an equal-opportunity harasser
would not bar sexual harassment claims against that harasser by both
men and women.' Barbara Steiner alleged that her boss, Jack Trenkle,
spoke to her in a threatening and derogatory fashion using sexually
explicit and offensive terms.'29 Trenkle's employer argued that Trenkle
harassed everyone and therefore was not harassing Steiner based on her
sex.' 30 The court accepted the fact that Trenkle was abusive to both men
and women; however, the court distinguished Trenkle's treatment of
Steiner from his treatment of male employees. 13' Trenkle had referred to
male employees as "assholes" but had referred to women as "dumb
fucking broads" and "fucking cunts.', 32 The Steiner court reasoned that
Trenkle's abuse of men did not relate to their gender and that Trenkle's
abuse of Steiner clearly did. 133
Although Steiner's analysis was similar to the severity gradations
found in Kopp and Kahn, Steiner went one step further in dicta and
concluded that even if Trenkle had used remarks equally degrading and
intense toward male employees, such conduct would not "cure" his
actions toward women. 134 The court added that it did not "rule out the
possibility that both men and women... [would] have viable claims
against Trenkle for sexual harassment."' 35 Therefore, the court did not
exclude victims of equal-opportunity harassers just because disparate
treatment could not be shown. 36 Commentators have concluded that the
127. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
128. Id. at 1464.
129. Id. at 1461.
130. Id. at 1463.
131. Id. at 1463-64.
132. Id. at 1464.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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court's reasoning denied the equal-opportunity-harasser defense and
allowed both men and women to lodge successful claims of sexual
harassment against the same harasser.'37
A district court in Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp.3 ' explained how
plaintiffs could satisfy the "because of sex" element without evidence of
disparate treatment.1 39 In Chiapuzio, the plaintiffs, Dale and Carla
Chiapuzio, complained that their supervisor, Eddie Bell, continuously
subjected them to sexually abusive remarks. 40 Specifically, Bell would
comment that Dale could not satisfy his wife sexually and that he, Bell,
could do a better job. 4' When speaking to Carla, Bell made sexually
explicit advances.'42 The employer argued that Bell harassed both men
and women and therefore could not have discriminated against the
Chiapuzios because of either's sex. 43 The court however, refused to
accept this defense.'"
First, the court broadly interpreted Meritor. '41 The U.S. Supreme
Court in Meritor affirmed that Title VII affords employees the right to
work in an environment "free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule
and insult.' 146 From this affirmation, the Chiapuzio court reasoned that
the U.S. Supreme Court was moving away from a disparate-treatment
analysis and toward a view that "gender harassment occurs when unwel-
come physical or verbal conduct creates a hostile work environment."'' "
In other words, the court chose to focus on the "un-welcome" and
"severe and pervasive" elements of the sexual harassment test with the
137. Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Can It Be Sex-Related for Purposes of
Title VII?, I EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 25, 40.n.121 (1997); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic
Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 443 n.486 (2000); Robin Applebaum, Note,
The "Undifferentiating Libido " A Need for Federal Legislation to Prohibit Sexual Harassment by a
Bisexual Sexual Harasser, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 601,617 (1997).
138. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
139. Id. at 1337-38.
140. Id. at 1335.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1336.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
147. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1336.
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belief that these elements would make up for any ambiguity as to the
question of "but for one's sex.'
' 48
Second, the court acknowledged that sexual harassment was an uneasy
fit under Title VII and adjusted its analysis of the "because of sex"
element accordingly. '4' The court relied on Judge Bork's often-cited
dissent in Vinson v. Taylor,50 which recognized that there was a problem
with including the traditional gender discrimination model in sexual
harassment. 151 Instead of analyzing the plaintiffs as a class, the court
separated each claim and analyzed each individually. 52 By analyzing
each claim on its own merits, the court determined that both plaintiffs
were harassed because of their sex.'53 The court reasoned that Bell in-
tended to demean and harass Dale because he was male due to remarks
regarding Dale's sexual prowess.'54 Such remarks would not have created
the same effect if they were directed toward a woman. 1 55 Similarly,
looking at only the circumstances and conduct directed toward Carla, the
court concluded she was harassed because she was female.'56 The key to
analysis of the evidence was not whether the perpetrator harassed only
members of one gender, but whether gender was a significant or
motivating factor in each allegation of harassment.'57 The court did not
eliminate the "because of sex" element; 58 rather, the court allowed the
element to be satisfied by considering the sufficiency of evidence for
each claim individually. 5' Therefore, analysis of the "because of sex"
element on an individual basis allowed the district court to deny the
equal-opportunity-harasser defense. 60
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1337.
150. 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
151. Id. at 1333 n.7 (Bork, J., dissenting).
152. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337-38.
153. Johnson, supra note 34, at 742-43.
154. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337.
155. Id. at 1337-38.
156. Id. at 1338.
157. Id. at 1337.
158. Id. at 1337-38.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1336.
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IV. COURTS SHOULD REJECT THE EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY-
HARASSER DEFENSE BY ADOPTING AN INDIVIDUAL
ANALYSIS OF THE "BECAUSE OF SEX" ELEMENT
Analyzing each claim individually will enable courts to deny the
equal-opportunity-harasser defense. Where a perpetrator harasses both
men and women, the traditional interpretation of the "because of sex"
element prevents plaintiffs from making the required showing of
disparate treatment. Evidence of disparate treatment, however, does not
exhaust the evidence of discrimination because of sex; individual
analysis of the plaintiff's claim may also expose harassment based on an
individual's sex. This analysis separates plaintiffs' claims and analyzes
conduct directed at each plaintiff individually. If that conduct is
motivated by the plaintiffs gender, then the plaintiff has satisfied the
"because of sex" element. By utilizing an individual analysis, courts can
deny the equal-opportunity-harasser defense, enable sexual harassment
law to fulfill its purpose, and avoid absurd results that occur with the
traditional disparate-treatment requirement.
A. Acceptance of the Equal-Opportunity-Harasser Defense Is Based
on Misplaced Reliance on the Need for Disparate-Treatment
Analysis
Evidence of disparate treatment is inappropriate in sexual harassment
claims because sexual harassment is an individual discrimination while
disparate treatment looks for discrimination on a class level. Courts
adopted the disparate-treatment analysis used to satisfy the "because of
sex" element in sexual harassment claims from the traditional sex
discrimination model. The problem with including this disparate
treatment within a sexual harassment framework is that sex discrim-
ination and sexual harassment are theoretically different. 161 While a
person who discriminates based on sex presumably discriminates against
all members of a particular sex, a sexual harasser may not harass all
161. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986). The U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Meritor acknowledged the fact that sexual harassment is not the same as class-based
discrimination by its suggestion that a plaintiff's provocative speech and dress may be admissible in
sexual harassment cases. See Michelle Ridgeway Peirce, Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII-A
Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. REv. 1071, 1094 (1989). If the work environment were hostile for one
gender, then characteristics of the plaintiff, one individual, should be immaterial. See id
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members of a certain sex and might harass members of both sexes."'6 The
decision to sexually harass a person is not based on gender alone but also
on considerations such as the relationship to the victim and the victim's
physical and social characteristics.'63 Therefore, in contrast to traditional
class-based sex discrimination, sexual harassment is directed at indi-
viduals. "6 This distinction makes sexual harassment claims an un-
comfortable fit with traditional sex discrimination analysis because a
court must use a class-based analysis to find individually based
harassment. '65
Judge Bork recognized this uneasiness when he argued against
making sexual harassment actionable in Vinson v. Taylor.'6 6 He noted
that under the traditional discrimination framework an equal-opportunity
harasser would be legally excused because a plaintiff would not be able
to prove the harassment was due to the plaintiff's sex where the
harassment was directed at both genders. 167 Importing the disparate-
treatment interpretation of the "because of sex" element from sex
discrimination cases thus created a hole in sexual harassment laws. By
looking for the effects of class-based discrimination, this analysis is blind
to situations where gender is just one factor in the harasser's selection of
a victim. 16 Judge Bork opined that if sexual harassment claims were to
be included in Title VII, they would require a separate analysis from
discrimination. 169 The district court in Chiapuzio heeded Judge Bork's
warning and developed an individualized analysis of the "because of
sex" element to hold equal-opportunity harassers accountable. 1
70
Most courts, however, have not heeded Judge Bork's objection. By
insisting on evidence of disparate treatment to satisfy the "because of
sex" element of a prima facie case of sexual harassment, courts have
created a doctrinal hole in sexual harassment law through which an
equal-opportunity harasser might slip. 7' The disparate-treatment re-
162. Locke, supra note 59, at 393; Paul, supra note 55, at 352.
163. See Paul, supra note 55, at 352.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
168. Paul, supra note 55, at 352.
169. Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1133 n.7 (Bork, J., dissenting).
170. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Locke,
supra note 59, at 390.
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quirement has forced courts to accept the equal-opportunity-harasser
defense because where employees of both sexes are being harassed alike
there can be no evidence of disparate treatment, and the "because of sex"
element becomes impossible to satisfy. 172 Courts should follow the
district court's example in Chiapuzio and recognize an individual
analysis of the "because of sex" element to protect all victims from
sexual harassment.
B. How an Individualized Analysis Operates To Satisfy the "Because
ofSex" Element
An individual analysis is simply a more in-depth review of the
evidence presented by each plaintiff. This analysis would more closely
examine an equal-opportunity harasser's conduct 73 and would not allow
a facial showing of a lack of disparate treatment to foreclose this
examination. 74 Under the traditional "because of sex" analysis, courts
have been primarily concerned with whether or not persons of the
opposite sex were harassed in a similar manner as the plaintiff.75 If the
harasser did harass a male and a female, courts have generally looked no
further than this facial analysis. 76 Rather than review the harasser's
conduct directed toward each victim, courts have automatically assumed
that such conduct was not because of either person's gender.'77
An individual analysis would not stop at this facial inquiry but would
accept the premise that a harasser can victimize both males and females.
The shift in approach would be largely procedural. First, if there were
multiple claims, the court would separate the plaintiffs' claims. 178
Second, when analyzing a plaintiffs claim, the court should only
examine conduct directed at that plaintiff individually regardless of
172 Applebaum, supra note 137, at 613.
173. Johnson, supra note 34, at 741-43.
174. This Comment does not address what should be the applicable test for the "because of sex"
element for all types of sexual harassment. Instead, this individual analysis should only be applied to
targeted conduct that is related to the victim's gender. Therefore, it does not apply to facially neutral
conduct, such as the telling ofjokes, cartoons, and the like.
175. Locke, supra note 59, at 393; Paul, supra note 55, at 352.
176. Applebaum, supra note 137, at 613.
177. Id.
178. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-38 (D. Wyo. 1993). The
Chiapuzio court appeared to create this individual analysis. See id.
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whether there were other victims of the harasser. 179 Therefore, evidence
of equal-opportunity harassment should not be dispositive, particularly
on summary judgment. 8 ' Finally, in order to establish a case from which
a fact-finder could reasonably infer that the harassment was because of
the plaintiffs sex, a plaintiff could present three types of evidence as
listed in Oncale.' These procedural modifications would keep the evi-
dentiary burden on the plaintiff, who would face a showing essentially
the same as in a traditional sexual harassment claim. The only difference
would be that the claim would not founder on evidence unrelated to
instances of discrimination against the individual.
An individual analysis would look for the same evidence of gender-
specific conduct as satisfies a traditional claim. Evidence that tra-
ditionally satisfies the "because of sex" element establishes a nexus
between the harasser's conduct and the victim's gender.'82 If the conduct
is related to the victim's gender, then the fact-finder can conclude that
gender animated the harasser's behavior.'83 Because such a nexus may
exist regardless of the plaintiffs conduct toward other employees, a fact-
finder should be permitted to draw a similar conclusion whenever a
plaintiff presents evidence of conduct related to his or her gender,
notwithstanding conduct related to other employees' genders.
The presentation of such evidence of gender-specific conduct to prove
discrimination because of sex falls squarely within the evidentiary
showing deemed sufficient by Oncale.'84 For example, terms such as
"cunt" and "broad" are derogatory terms traditionally used to refer to
women.'85 Because such abusive terms are centered upon a particular
sex, a fact-finder could conclude that the victim was harassed because
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1338.
181. Id.; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
182. Gender refers to not only whether a person is a male or a female, but also includes cultural
manifestations of sex. See Paetzold, supra note 137, at 27 n.13. This includes personality traits and
physical characteristics of a person that are considered to be tied to a particular sex and therefore are
presumed to be displayed by that particular sex. Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment,
Revisited: The Aftermath ofOncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 3 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 251, 257-58 (1999). For example, sensitivity and emotional behavior (personality traits) as
well as certain types of clothes, makeup and hairstyles (physical characteristics) are associated with
females. Id.
183. Id. at 45-46.
184. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
185. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994).
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she was female. 86 Conduct or language that would almost fail entirely of
its crude purpose had the victim been of the opposite sex might show a
similar nexus with the victim's sex. "87 For example, a harasser who
draws cartoons of the victim giving birth to a baby and exaggerates the
sexual characteristics of the victim will, generally, have a more profound
effect upon a female victim than a male victim.'88 By focusing on the
nexus between specific conduct and the plaintiff's gender, a court should
not be able to conclude that evidence of unrelated conduct defeats, as a
matter of law, plaintiffs evidence of sexual harassment.18 9
Applying this analysis to the facts of Holman v. Indiana,9 ' discussed
in the introduction of this Comment, will further explain its operation.
First, a court would separate Karen and Steven's claims. Then, the court
would look at the harassing conduct directed toward Karen individually.
In Karen's case, her supervisor, Gale, touched her body, sexually
propositioned her, and made derogatory remarks about women. A fact-
finder could reasonably have concluded that Gale touched Karen and
sexually propositioned her because she was a woman and he was
attracted to her. Similarly, a fact-finder could have concluded that the
sexist remarks would not have had the same derogatory and offending
effect if they were directed toward a male. Because Karen's evidence
supported the conclusion that the supervisor chose the conduct he aimed
at Karen because she was a female, the court should not have granted
summary judgment upon the employer's evidence of unrelated conduct.
After rejecting summary judgment on Karen's claim, the court would
then turn to Steven's claim. Gale repeatedly asked Steven for sexual
favors. 9 ' When these favors were rejected, Gale retaliated against him. 92
Such evidence reasonably suggests that the supervisor was attracted to
Steven because he was a man and that there was a quid (retaliation)
based on a quo (rebuffed proposition). 93 This evidence would have
186. Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1463-64.
187. Zabkowicz v. W. Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
188. Id. at 783-84.
189. See Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (D. Wyo. 1993).
190. 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
191. Id. at 401.
192. Id.
193. In regards to same-sex harassment, this test serves to overcome orientation bias. Tra-
ditionally, under opposite-sex harassment there is a presumption or inference that sexual conduct is
sex-based, whereas in same-sex harassment there is an opposite presumption that the conduct was
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carried Steven's claim past summary judgment had evidence of unrelated
conduct not been given dispositive weight. As these examples show, an
individual analysis would simply allow courts to reach the merits of
discrete claims where plaintiffs present otherwise sufficient evidence of
gender-based conduct.
C. An Individual Analysis Is an Appropriate Method for Proving the
"Because of Sex" Element
Individually analyzing a plaintiff's claim on its own merits finds
support in sexual harassment case law. Adoption of an individual
analysis would follow an emerging trend in federal and Washington law.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that evidentiary
alternatives besides disparate treatment are permissible to support a
claim of sexual harassment.
1. Adoption of an Individual Analysis of the "Because of Sex"
Element Would Be Consistent with an Emerging Trend in
Washington and Federal Law
An individual analysis of the "because of sex" element finds support
in Kopp v. Samaritan Health System' 94 and Kahn v. Salerno.'95 Where a
distinction could be made in the severity of the harassment, these courts
held that the equal-opportunity-harasser defense did not apply because
the plaintiff could show disparate treatment. 196 Rather than accept the
irrelevant excuse that harassment was directed at both a man and a
woman, these courts required an in-depth analysis of the conduct itself.'97
not sex-based. Lussier, supra note 22. This is referred to as the heterosexist bias. Id. Courts view
sexual harassment claims through the lens of heterosexuality. Id.; Paetzold, supra note 137, at 61-
62. For opposite-sex harassment, the court views sexual conduct through this lens, which provides
the nexus between the conduct and the individual's sex. Lussier, supra note 22, at 944-45. However,
when the court operates under this same view when dealing with same-sex harassment, the
presumption leaves the court with the view that the conduct was not related to the sex of the victim
but was rather general hostility toward the individual. Id. The proposed individual analysis would
end this bias because it would suggest that sexual conduct is sex-based regardless of whether it is
same-sex or opposite-sex harassment. See id.; Paetzold, supra note 137, at 61-62.
194. 13 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1993).
195. 90 Wash. App. 110, 951 P.2d 321 (1998).
196. Kopp, 13 F.3d at 269; Kahn, 90 Wash. App. at 124, 951 P.2d at 329.
197. Kopp, 13 F.3d at 269; Kahn, 90 Wash. App. at 124, 951 P.2d at 329.
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Although the Kopp and Kahn decisions illustrate successful rejection
of the equal-opportunity-harasser defense, requiring evidence of
disparate treatment preserves the defense in situations where the court
cannot distinguish between severities of harassment. 98 For example, by
showing that victims of the harasser were exposed to varying degrees of
harassment, the Kopp and Kahn courts were able to stay within the
confines of a disparate-treatment requirement while allowing the victims'
claims to go forward.199 In cases where the harassment is equal in
severity or where the court cannot make a distinction, this reasoning will
force courts to deny claims of equal-opportunity-harasser victims. An
alternative, and a lasting solution, would be to adopt an individual
analysis not susceptible to the equal-opportunity-harasser defense.
The careful examination by the Kopp and Kahn courts of the
distinction in harassment severity is just one step removed from an
individual analysis. Rather than just looking to see if a difference in the
severity of the conduct exists, a court could separately analyze each
victim and determine whether the conduct was based on the victim's sex.
For courts like Kopp and Kahn that are already conducting an analysis of
the unique context of the harassment, an individual analysis of a
plaintiff's sexual harassment claim would require no additional judicial
burden.
The Chiapuzio court has already taken this next step and replaced
evidence of disparate treatment with an individual analysis, thereby
precluding the defense. This court acknowledged that sexual harassment
can be directed at individuals of both sexes by the same harasser."0 To
allow a claim of sexual harassment, the Chiapuzio court reviewed the
conduct aimed at each plaintiff individually.2 ' Because gender was a
motivating factor in the harassment, the plaintiff had satisfied the
"because of sex" element.0 2 This analysis no longer requires plaintiffs to
show disparate treatment. By adopting an individual analysis, Chiapuzio
provides a foundation to deny the equal-opportunity-harasser defense.
Washington and federal courts should follow this lead and deny the
equal-opportunity-harasser defense.
198. Kopp, 13 F.3d at 269; Kahn, 90 Wash. App. at 124,951 P.2d at 329.
199. Kopp, 13 F.3d at 269; Kahn, 90 Wash. App. at 124, 951 P.2d at 329.
200. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-38 (D. Wyo. 1993).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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2. The U.S. Supreme Court No Longer Requires Evidence of
Disparate Treatment Under the "Because of Sex" Element
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,203 the U.S. Supreme
Court paved the way for courts to accept an individual analysis of the
"because of sex" element. The Oncale Court ruled that evidence of
disparate treatment was sufficient but no longer necessary to establish
discrimination "because of sex."'2'4 In Oncale, the Court was faced with a
same-sex sexual harassment claim where evidence of disparate treatment
would have been unavailable because the court was unable to compare
conduct toward the plaintiff against conduct toward women.0 5
Showing that same-sex harassment was prohibited under Title VII, the
Court stated in dicta that a plaintiff could show discrimination "because
of sex" with three different types of evidence: (1) comparative evidence,
(2) evidence of gender-specific conduct or actions, or (3) evidence of
explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity.26 Evidence of disparate
treatment is thus no longer necessary to establish a prima facie case of
sexual harassment.2 7 By adding the second and third types of evidentiary
showings, the Court opened the door to an individual analysis of the
"because of sex" element because such evidence concerns conduct
directed toward the individual plaintiff. Hence, the Court has implicitly
allowed an individual analysis to satisfy the "because of sex" element.
In Holman v. Indiana,°8 the Seventh Circuit incorrectly read Oncale
to require proof of disparate treatment in all cases of sexual harassment.
In Holman, the court made clear that Oncale "explained that one way to
ensure that Title VII does not mutate from a prohibition on sexual
discrimination to a general prohibition on harassment is to... [require] a
demonstration that there be different treatment of the sexes.,,2' From this
203. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
204. See id. at 80-81; LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 46, at 52; Coombs, supra note 72, at
129-30; Lussier, supra note 22, at 957-58.
205. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81. Although not stated expressly, the facts of the case make it
clear that no women were present in the workplace. See id. at 77 (referring to plaintiffs employment
on "eight-man crew').
206. Id. at 80-81.
207. See id.
208. 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
209. Id. at 404 (emphasis in original).
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concern voiced in Oncale, the Holman court reasoned that disparate
treatment is required in all cases of sexual harassment.2"'
This analysis ignores, however, the fact that Oncale stated disparate
treatment was one way to ensure protection against a civility code.2 The
Court in Oncale went on to suggest two other means to ensure that the
harassment was based on the victim's sex.2 12 Furthermore, disparate
treatment was impossible to establish in Oncale because there were no
female employees against which to examine the victim's harassment.
Although the Court was not entirely clear in its reasoning, commentators
agree that Oncale provided plaintiffs with three options to satisfy the
"because of sex" element.1 3
D. Courts Must Deny the Equal-Opportunity-Harasser Defense To
Avoid Absurd Results and To Fulfill the Purpose of Sexual
Harassment Laws
1. Acceptance of the Defense Leads to Inequitable and Absurd Results
By allowing the equal-opportunity-harasser defense, courts create
inequitable and absurd results. First, acceptance of the defense leaves an
entire group of sexual harassment victims without protection simply
because the perpetrator was an equal-opportunity harasser. 214 For
example, in Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 215 the plaintiff satisfied the
"because of sex"216 element when she presented evidence that her
supervisor made sexual innuendoes and called her "sexy bitch" and
"slut. ' 2 17 Conversely, in a similar fact scenario involving an equal-
opportunity harasser, the court in Holman rejected the plaintiffs sexual
harassment claim because the harasser also aimed his conduct toward a
male employee. 2 1 Thus, similarly situated plaintiffs were treated dif-
210. Id. at 403.
211. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
212. Id.
213. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 46, at 52; Coombs, supra note 72, at 129-30; Lussier,
supra note 22, at 957-58.
214. Ruczek v. Guest Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 761-62 (D.D.C. 1995); see also Paul, supra
note 55, at 351-52; Applebaum, supra note 137, at 613.
215. 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
216. Id. at 782.
217. Id. at 785.
218. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399,404 (7th Cir. 2000).
Washington Law Review
ferently under Title VII. Although one plaintiffs injury was remedied
while another plaintiff's injury was not, this is not the most significant
difference. The real difference is that the plaintiffs like the one in
Zabkowicz are able to pursue discrete claims on their own merits while
the Holman plaintiffs had their claims muted by other, unrelated claims.
Because alternative causes of action, such as the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, 2 9 assault, 220 or outrage,2 ' are not viable
options, this difference leaves an entire class of victims without a legal
remedy.22
2
Second, an equal-opportunity harasser is a more offensive person than
a traditional harasser because an equal-opportunity harasser treats
everyone abusively. 23 This reprehensible conduct should not serve as a
defense to liability for such actions. 224 Simply put, the courts are
accepting that the more people one harasses, the less susceptible one is to
prosecution.22" This result directly contradicts the purpose of sexual
harassment laws because it allows conduct that supports inequitable
barriers in the workplace to go unpunished merely because the
perpetrator chose to harass both a male and a female rather than only one
individual.
219. Applebaum, supra note 137, at 618-19. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress requires that the plaintiff suffer severe or extreme emotional distress from extreme or
outrageous conduct from the harasser. Id. at 619. Because many victims of harassment do not suffer
severe emotional distress as a result of being harassed, this cause of action is not a viable claim for
many harassment victims. Id.
220. Id. at 620. Assault requires an apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact. Id. Words
alone will usually not support a cause of action for assault. Id.
221. The tort of outrage is supported by a showing that the defendant's conduct was "so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Grimbsy v.
Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 59, 530 P.2d 291, 295 (1975). The plaintiff cannot establish the tort of
outrage based on mere insults and indignities that cause embarrassment or humiliation. Dicomes v.
Washington, 113 Wash. 2d 612, 630, 782 P.2d 1002, 1013 (1989).
222. In addition, battery and constructive discharge are unavailing. Battery requires the plaintiff
to prove that there was unpermitted physical contact, and this may not occur in a sexual harassment
context. Applebaum, supra note 137, at 620. For constructive discharge, existence of unlawful sex
discrimination alone will not support the claim. Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash. 2d
401,408, 693 P.2d 708, 713 (1985).
223. Ruczek v. Guest Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 762 (D.D.C. 1995).
224. Applebaum, supra note 137, at 616.
225. Id.
Vol. 76:603, 2001
The Equal-Opportunity-Harasser Defense
2. The Equal-Opportunity-Harasser Defense Frustrates the Purpose
Behind Sexual Harassment Laws
Equal-opportunity harassment creates the same hostile work
environment and inequalities that traditional harassment does and thus
should be prohibited by sexual harassment laws. Courts have recognized
that the purpose behind prohibiting sexual harassment was to eradicate
arbitrary barriers to sexual equality in the workplace.~6 Like a traditional
harasser, a perpetrator who harasses members of both sexes confounds
this purpose in two ways. 2 7 First, the equal-opportunity harasser's
motivation behind the harassment is the same as in traditional sexual
harassment because the perpetrator singles out a victim for gendered
reasons. 228 Second, the effect of the harassment is the same as in
traditional sexual harassment as victims are forced to experience
unwelcome sexual advances, physical contact, or verbal abuse."2 9 Such
conduct supports the continuation of sex stereotyping and the mainte-
nance of a gender hierarchy because it serves to punish those who do not
conform to scripted gender norms " and to block professional op-
portunities for both sexes." t Therefore, an equal-opportunity haras-ser's
conduct leads to the same arbitrary barriers to sexual equality in the
workplace.z 2 In order to bring these harassers within the policy bounds
of sexual harassment laws, courts should adopt an individual analysis of
the "because of sex" element and eliminate the equal-opportunity-
harasser defense.
226. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986); Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 405,
693 P.2d at 71 1.
227. See Trish K. Murphy, Comment, Without Distinction: Recognizing Coverage of Same-
Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1125, 1147-49 (1995).
228. Locke, supra note 59, at 407.
229. See Peirce, supra note 161, at 1096 ('IT]he offensiveness of the harassment is not lessened
merely because the employer also harasses men. To the woman it is the harassment itself that
offends.").
230. See Andrea Dworkin, Women in the Public Domain: Sexual Harassment and Date Rape, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: WOMEN SPEAK OUT 1-5 (Amber Coverdale Slumrall & Dena Taylor eds.,
1992); EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 233.
231. See Carlos R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment
Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55, 79 (1995); Spitko, supra note 20, at 72 n.79; Susan Silberman
Blasi, Comment, The Adjudication ofSame-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title V1, 12 LAB.
LAW. 291,319-20 (1996).
232. See supra note 231.
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Washington has an even greater responsibility to adopt an individual
analysis because Washington statutory law 233 mandates that sexual ha-
rassment laws be given liberal construction in order to fulfill their
purpose of eradicating barriers to sexual equality in the workplace and
protecting all employees from sexual harassment.234 Washington courts
have used liberal construction to modify sexual harassment law so that
inequities in the workplace are extinguished. For example, the
Washington Court of Appeals, in Payne v. Children's Home Society of
Washington, Inc.,2 35 had to decide whether a sexual harassment claim
existed where the conduct complained of was not explicitly sexual.236
Although the WLAD was silent on this issue, the court reasoned that
gender-based harassment that is not of a sexual nature also creates
barriers to sexual equality.237 Therefore, to fulfill the statute's purpose,
the court determined that conduct need not be sexual in nature to support
a claim for sexual harassment under the WLAD. 238
Likewise, when presented with the equal-opportunity-harasser de-
fense, Washington courts should liberally construe the WLAD and adopt
an individual analysis to deny this defense. By allowing the defense,
courts protect conduct that would otherwise be harassment but for a
broader group of victims.2 39 Instead of fulfilling the statute's purpose, the
defense leaves a supervisor with the power to sexualize the workplace.
This result contradicts the statute's purpose because the harassing
conduct serves to punish victims for not following gender norms
established by the harasser and creates barriers to advancement in the
workplace for both sexes. 240
3. Denial of the Equal-Opportunity-Harasser Defense Would Not
Render Sexual Harassment Laws a "Code of Workplace Civility"
Rejecting the equal-opportunity-harasser defense and no longer
requiring a showing of disparate treatment will not turn sexual ha-
233. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (2000).
234. Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 401,405, 693 P.2d 708, 711 (1985).
235. 77 Wash. App. 507, 892 P.2d 1102 (1995).
236. Id. at 510, 892 P.2d at 1104.
237. Id. at 511, 892 P.2d at 1105.
238. Id. at 511-12,892 P.2d at 1105.
239. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
240. See Calleros, supra note 231, at 79; Murphy, supra note 227, at 1147-49.
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rassment laws into a code of conduct for the workplace. Proponents of
the defense fear that by discarding the disparate-treatment requirement,
sexual harassment laws will become regulations of how employees
should treat each other;24' however, this fear is misguided.
First, although evidence of disparate treatment would not be required
under the new individualized analysis of the "because of sex" element,
the plaintiff must still show that one of the motivating factors behind the
harasser's conduct was the plaintiff's gender.242 This requirement would
still guard against Title VII and state harassment laws turning into
general harassment statutes in the workplace because the plaintiff would
still have to show a nexus between the harassment and the plaintiffs
gender.243
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court in Oncale stated that the "severe and
pervasive" element is the crucial requirement to protect against a
workplace civility code.2' If the harasser's conduct is not severe and
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile work environment, then
the conduct does not rise to the level of actionable sexual harassment.
245
Finally, the decision in Oncale no longer requires a showing of
disparate treatment.246 If the Court was concerned that sexual harassment
laws would turn into civility codes without proof of disparate treatment,
the Court would not have provided plaintiffs alternatives to showing
disparate treatment. 2 Therefore, rejecting the equal-opportunity-
harasser defense and not requiring proof of disparate treatment will not
render sexual harassment laws civility codes.
V. CONCLUSION
Washington and federal courts should adopt an individual analysis of
the "because of sex" element, thus abolishing the equal-opportunity-
harasser defense. The defense allows outrageous harassers to go
unpunished and leaves unprotected victims who are forced to endure
241. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399,403 (2000).
242. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998); LINDEMANN &
KADUE, supra note 46, at 52-53.
243. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
244. Id. at 82; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
245. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
246. See id. at 80-81; supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
247. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
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appalling employment situations. Evidence of disparate treatment to
satisfy the "because of sex" element is inappropriate in equal-
opportunity-harasser cases because it is a class-based analysis attempting
to detect an individual discrimination. Although Washington and federal
courts have already tried to get around the defense by making a
distinction in the severity of the harassment, disparate-treatment analysis
will limit the ability of the courts to handle equally severe harassment.
The logical progression of these courts' efforts is to adopt an individual
analysis that will provide lasting protection for all victims of equal-
opportunity harassers. The U.S. Supreme Court has already paved the
way for an individual analysis by no longer requiring evidence of
disparate treatment to satisfy the "because of sex" element. To protect all
victims of sexual harassment and to curb absurd results of the defense,
Washington and federal courts should adopt an individual analysis of the
"because of sex" element, thereby rejecting the equal-opportunity-
harasser defense.
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